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JURISDICTION 
On April 4, 2011, this Court granted Washington City's petition for permission to 
appeal from an interlocutory order of the district court. The petition was initially 
transferred to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court. Therefore, the Court's jurisdiction 
is invoked under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5 and Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(j) 
(Supp.2011). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Court granted permission to review the following issues, as framed in the 
City's petition: 
I. 
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act requires a plaintiff asserting a claim for injury 
against a governmental entity to first file a written notice of claim that includes a brief 
statement of the facts on which the claims are based and a statement of the nature of the 
claims that the plaintiff intends to assert. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (Supp. 
2003). This notice of claim requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining a 
lawsuit, and nothing less than strict compliance is sufficient to vest a trial court with 
jurisdiction over the claims. See Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 11, \ 14, 
155 P.3d 900. Here, Plaintiffs filed a notice of claim with the City dealing exclusively 
with their fear about water pressure and the sizing of pipes within the City's waterworks 
system. Plaintiffs thereafter sued the City for various tort claims arising out the City's 
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inspection of their building for fire code compliance and refusal to issue a certificate of 
occupancy for the building. Does the trial court have jurisdiction over these tort claims? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's denial of a summary judgment motion 
is reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the trial court's decision. See Orvis v. 
Johnson, 2008 UT 2,1j 6, 177 P.3d 600. 
Preservation. The City presented this issue below in its summary 
judgment briefing (R. 199X-199B1) and in its petition for permission to appeal from the 
interlocutory order denying summary judgment, see City's Interlocutory Pet. at 6, 9-11. 
II. 
If the Court determines the trial court did not err in denying the City summary 
judgment on the notice of claim issue, the second issue presented for appeal is as follows: 
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act immunizes governmental entities from 
lawsuits for damages that arise out of, in connection with, or result from the failure to 
make an inspection or a negligent or inadequate inspection, as well as the refusal to issue 
"any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization." Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-30-10(3), (4). Here, Plaintiffs have sued the City under various tort theories 
in which they seek damages relating to the City's inspection of their building for fire 
code compliance and its subsequent refusal to issue them a certificate of occupancy for 
the building. Did the trial court correctly rule that the City does not have immunity from 
Plaintiffs' tort claims? 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review. A trial court's denial of a summary judgment motion 
is reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the trial court's decision. See Orvis, 
2008 UT 2, f 6. 
Preservation. The City presented this issue below in its summary 
judgment briefing (R. 199C1-199P1) and in its petition for permission to appeal from the 
interlocutory order denying summary judgment, see City's Interlocutory Pet. at 7, 11-15. 
III. 
Under settled Utah law, a building permit does not create contractual obligations 
between the issuing city and a permittee. See Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT 
App 11, THf 25-27, 155 P.3d 900. Plaintiffs sued the City for breach of contract premised 
on the argument that the building permit the City issued to them created a contractual 
obligation between Plaintiffs and the City. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant the 
City summary judgment on Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's denial of a summary judgment motion 
is reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the trial court's decision. See Orvis, 
2008 UT 2, If 6. 
Preservation. The City presented this issue below in its summary 
judgment briefing (R. 199V-199W) and in its petition for permission to appeal from the 
interlocutory order denying summary judgment, see City's Interlocutory Pet. at 7-8, 16-
17. 
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IV. 
Rule 56(f) allows a party to delay consideration of a summary judgment motion if 
he can identify what discovery or affidavits he can obtain that would enable him to 
successfully oppose the summary judgment motion. Did the trial court err in using Rule 
56(f) as a basis to deny the City's summary judgment motion and to thereafter require the 
parties to proceed directly to a trial on the merits? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's ruling on a Rule 56(f) motion is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard: "Does the grant or denial exceed 'the 
limits of reasonability.'" Price Dev. Co. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 26, ^ 9, 995 P.2d 1237 
(quoting Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994)). 
Preservation. The City presented this issue below in its opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motion (R. 204-204K), in its objection to the order granting 
Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motion (R. 210-210A), and in its petition for permission to take an 
interlocutory appeal from the order granting Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motion, see City's 
Interlocutory Pet. at 8, 17-20. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Central to the outcome of this appeal are the following statutes: Utah Code §§ 
63-30-11(2), (3) (Supp. 2003) (repealed 2004); 63-30-10(3), (4) (Supp. 2003) 
(repealed 2004), the relevant portions of which are reproduced at Addendum 1. 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
This case arises from Washington City's ongoing efforts to ensure that Plaintiffs' 
building complies with the fire code. It all began when the Plaintiffs (hereinafter the 
"Clouds") constructed a moving and storage warehouse in Washington City. After 
construction was complete, the Clouds requested the City issue a certificate of 
occupancy. The City refused because its fire chief inspected the building and determined 
that it did not comply with the fire code. 
The Clouds sued the City for breach of contract and sought an ex parte TRO to 
restrain the City from taking any action to enforce its fire code. (R. 1.) Solely on the 
basis of this alleged breach, the trial court issued an ex parte TRO restraining the City 
from enforcing its fire code. (R. 8.) At the subsequent injunction hearing, the trial court 
sua sponte determined that the City violated the Clouds' civil and constitutional rights 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and entered an injunction ordering the City to issue the Clouds a 
certificate of occupancy. (R. 138C1 Tr. 185:7-22, 195; R. 121-122.) 
Shortly after the injunction was issued, the Clouds amended their complaint to 
actually include, in addition to their contract claims, causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, violations of due process, takings, "private attorney general," and state tort claims 
for conversion and interference with economic relations. (R. 129.) The amended 
complaint also named three new defendants along with several new plaintiffs. (R. 129.) 
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The City responded by removing the case to the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Utah. (R. 131-131C.) It then moved for summary judgment and dissolution of the 
injunction. (R. 138-138M.) In April 2005, the U.S. District Court granted the City's 
motion, entered summary judgment in favor of the City on all federal claims asserted— 
including the § 1983 and takings claims—and dissolved the injunction. (R. 138; Cloud v. 
Washington City, No. 2:04-CV-00246 (D. Utah April 75 2005).)1 The U.S. District Court 
then remanded the state claims back to the state trial court for resolution. (R. 138L; 
Cloud, Order Granting Partial S J. at 13, No. 2:04-CV-00246.) 
After remand, the City moved for summary judgment on these remaining claims. 
(R. 154.) But instead of ruling on the motion, the trial court sua sponte stayed the 
litigation and referred the Clouds to the Utah Fire Prevention Board to take a belated 
appeal of the fire chiefs decision to deny the Clouds a certificate of occupancy. (R. 162-
164.) 
After a hearing, the Fire Prevention Board ruled that the Clouds' building did not 
comply with the fire code and therefore the City's decision to deny occupancy was 
correct. (R. 200J3-200M3.) The Board also granted the Clouds a temporary certificate 
of occupancy for a one year period of time to give them time to come into compliance 
with the fire code. (R. 200M3.) 
Unsatisfied with this result, the Clouds challenged the Fire Prevention Board's 
decision pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act by filing for de novo review 
1
 A copy of the U.S. District Court's ruling is attached at Addendum 3. 
6 
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in the district court. (R. 199U.) That administrative appeal was consolidated into this 
case. (R. 199U.) 
Once the matter was back before the trial court, and with all fact discovery 
completed, the City again moved for summary judgment on all remaining damages 
claims. (R. 197.) Instead of opposing that motion, the Clouds filed a Rule 56(f) motion. 
(R. 201-202.) Their Rule 56(f) motion, however, sought nothing more than to avoid the 
City's summary judgment motion and obtain a trial on the merits. (R. 201-203.) On 
February 23, 2011, the trial court issued an order denying the City's motion for summary 
judgment, granting the Clouds' Rule 56(f) motion, and ordering the case to trial. (R. 215-
215A.)2 
The City petitioned this Court for permission to take an interlocutory appeal of the 
trial court's February 23 Order. This Court granted the City's petition. At the City's 
request, the trial court has stayed the litigation pending resolution of this appeal. (R. 221, 
239.) 
A copy of this order is attached at Addendum 2. 
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
A, The Genesis of the Litigation. 
In 2001, the Clouds4 purchased some property in Washington City, Utah, 
intending to construct a building from which to operate their moving and storage 
business. (R. 199K.) After obtaining a conditional use permit from the City for this 
intended use, the Clouds applied for a building permit to construct their building, an 
approximately 10,000 square foot moving and storage facility. (R. 199K.) The Clouds' 
building plans did not include an automatic fire sprinkling system. (R. 199K.) The City 
did not expressly condition approval of the plans on the inclusion of an automatic fire 
sprinkling system, nor did the City expressly mention an automatic fire sprinkling system 
during the building approval process as a requirement for approval. (R. 199K-199L.) 
In July 2001, one of the City's building officials, Defendant Creig Maynes, issued 
the Clouds a building permit. (R. 199L.) The Clouds then proceeded with the 
construction of their building. (R. 199L.) The building consists of a warehouse area of 
approximately 8,976 square feet and an office space of approximately 1,024 square feet. 
(R. 199L.) The warehouse space from floor to ceiling is approximately 25 to 26-feet 
high. (R. 199L.) 
3
 These facts are the undisputed facts before the trial court on summary judgment. 
4
 There are numerous plaintiffs listed on the caption of the case, which include 
various Cloud family members and businesses owned or controlled by them. To date, the 
Clouds have made no effort to explain how each plaintiff has standing to pursue the 
claims alleged in the complaint. However, for purposes of summary judgment and this 
appeal, we have simply referred to them as, collectively, "the Clouds." 
8 
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The Clouds intended to use their building to hold and store "vaults," which are 
large, pallet-like wooden containers in which household items are sealed then stored. (R. 
199L.) The Clouds intended to fill the warehouse by stacking the vaults and fitting them 
"like a puzzle." (R. 199L.) Given the height of the warehouse area, the Clouds intended 
to stack the vaults two to three high in order to maximize their warehouse space and, 
consequently, their profits. (R. 199L-199M.) Stacked only two-high, the vaults measure 
14-feet in height. (R. 199L-199M.)5 
Under the Uniform Fire Code, "storage of combustible materials in closely packed 
piles or combustible materials on pallets, in racks or on shelves, where the top of the 
storage is greater than 12 feet (3658 mm) in height," constitutes "High-Piled Combustible 
Storage." (R. 199N; see also 1997 Uniform Fire Code § 209-H.)6 Buildings utilized for 
high-piled combustible storage in areas of between 2,500 to 12,000 square feet are 
required by the fire code to have certain measures installed for fire protection, including 
an automatic fire suppression (sprinkling) system. (R. 200C1; 1997 Uniform Fire Code 
Table 81-A.)7 
5
 After construction was completed, the Clouds did, in fact, stack the vaults in the 
warehouse area of their building two-high. (R. 199L-199M.) They would have gone 
higher but did not have enough vaults to fill up their floor. {Id.) 
6
 The 1997 Uniform Fire Code was in effect as the City's fire code at the time. (R. 
199N.) Copies of the relevant provisions of the 1997 Uniform Fire Code are in the 
record at R.200-200G1. 
7
 To be sure, the fire code provides an additional option for high-piled storage in 
lieu of an automatic fire sprinkling system. This option—known as Option 2—requires 
Continued 
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City building officials conducted various inspections during construction of the 
building but never expressly mentioned the need for a fire sprinkling system during these 
inspections. (R. 199M.) 
Sometime in early January 2002, the Clouds requested a final certificate of 
occupancy. (R. 199M.) Around the same time, the City had its fire chief, Defendant 
Dwayne Isom, inspect the building for fire code compliance. (R. 199M.) Prior to his 
January 2002 inspection, Chief Isom had not conducted any inspections of or reviewed 
any plans for the building. (R. 199N.) 
On inspection, Chief Isom made the determination that the building required an 
automatic fire sprinkling system because the Clouds intended to use the building as a 
"high-piled combustible storage area" under the Uniform Fire Code. (R. 199N.) The 
Clouds' building did not (and does not) have an automatic fire sprinkling system. (R. 
199N.) As a result, Chief Isom did not pass the building on its final inspection for fire 
code compliance. (R. 199N.) Consequently, the City did not issue a final certificate of 
occupancy for the building. (R. 199N.) 
Three avenues of appeal existed for the Clouds to obtain a review of Chief Isom's 
decision as well as the City's decision not to issue a certificate of occupancy: 1) appeal 
to a board of appeals under the Uniform Fire Code; 2) appeal to the Utah Fire Prevention 
installation of: (i) a compliant fire detection system; (ii) appropriate building access; (iii) 
a compliant smoke and removal system; (iv) curtain boards; and (v) small hose and valve 
stations. (R. 1990; see also 1997 Uniform Fire Code, Table 81-A (vol. I 1997).) It is 
undisputed that the Clouds' building did not (and does not) have all of these items 
installed in lieu of a fire sprinkling system. (R. 1990.) 
10 
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Board; or 3) appeal to the Washington City Board of Adjustment. (R. 1990-199P [1997 
Uniform Fire Code § 103.1.4; Utah Admin. Code R710-9-16.2 (2004); Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 10-9-701, -703, -703 (2004); Washington City Zoning Ord. Ch. 4]; see also Cloud, 
Order Granting Partial S J. at 11-14, No. 2:04-CV-00246-PGC (D. Utah April 7, 2005) 
(summarizing available remedies and the Clouds' failure to pursue those remedies). 
When the City refused to issue the Clouds a certificate of occupancy, the Clouds 
retained the services of a local attorney to represent them in the matter. (R. 199P.) While 
the Clouds and their attorney had conversations with various city officials and 
"protested" the City's decision not to issue the certificate of occupancy, they did not 
appeal Chief Isom's interpretation of the fire code to the board of appeals. (R. 199P.) 
And they did not appeal Chief Isom's interpretation of the fire code to the Utah Fire 
Prevention Board. (R. 199P.) And they did not appeal the City's refusal to issue a 
certificate of occupancy for their building to the Washington City Board of Adjustment. 
(R. 199P.) 
Their excuse, and the excuse offered by their attorney, was that they were never 
specifically told by the City how to appeal the City's decisions. (R. 199P.) Each of these 
administrative appeal procedures, however, was published in generally available 
resources. (R. 138G-138I; Cloud, Order Granting Partial SJ. at 8-10 .) But the Clouds 
1 1 
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(and their attorney) never informed themselves of these publicly available remedies. (R. 
138G-138I; Cloud, Order Granting Partial S.J. at 8-10.)8 
Despite their "protests" to the contrary, the Clouds believe the decision to require 
an automatic fire sprinkling system in their building was the right decision. (R. 199P-
199Q.) Plaintiff Debbie Cloud, testified in her deposition: 
Q. Do you think that Chief Isom's requirement to put a sprinkling system 
in your building was the wrong decision? 
A. It may have been the right decision. I wished he was at the meetings to 
show me that they needed to be done. I wish somebody would have 
caught it sooner that it needed to be done, and I could have got the 
funding for it. It wouldn't have been a problem to do it. It's just after 
the fact it was a problem. 
Q. Okay. So you don't-with respect to the decision itself -
A. No, it was probably a good one. 
(R. 199Q.) 
B. The City Proposes a Solution and Gives the Clouds Over a Year 
to Come into Compliance with the Fire Code. 
Shortly after the fire chiefs inspection, the Clouds were advised that the City was 
willing to accommodate them to allow for a certificate of occupancy for the building in 
exchange for providing the City with a waiver of liability in the event of a fire and a 
This was one of the issues resolved in the City's favor by the U.S. District Court, 
which held that the Clouds (and their attorney) could not claim ignorance of the appeals 
processes as an excuse for not exercising their appeal rights: "The court finds, as a 
matter of law, that no 'rationale justifies requiring individualized notice of state-law 
remedies which ... are established by published, generally available state statutes and 
case law.'" Cloud, Order Granting Partial S.J. at 8-10 (quoting City of West Covina v. 
Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 241 (1999)). 
12 
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commitment to install a fire sprinkling system. (R. 199Q.) The City even had a waiver 
prepared, but the Clouds never signed it. (R. 199Q.) 
Over a year later, in April 2003, the City sent a letter to the Clouds reminding 
them that their building was not in compliance with fire code: "the City has tried to 
reasonably accommodate you by providing you with an extended period of time in which 
to make the required improvements to your facility. To date, we are unaware of any 
progress toward installation of a sprinkler system or any commitment that such a system 
will be installed by a date certain." (R. 199Q-199R.) The City then advised the Clouds 
that they would be required to "within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter ... 
execute a waiver document and an agreement by which you commit to install the required 
sprinkler system within a period of time acceptable to the City, but not later than 
September 1, 2003. Should you fail to timely act, the City will be forced to take 
appropriate action(s) to enforce compliance with the foregoing requirements and/or 
address your continued non-compliance." (R. 199Q-199R.) 
C. The Clouds Head to Court. 
The Clouds responded on August 5, 2003 by suing the City. (R. 1.) The original 
complaint alleged only two causes of action: 1) breach of contract and 2) breach of good 
faith and fair dealing. (R. 1, 199R.) It named Washington City as the only defendant. 
(R. 1, 199R.) In addition to filing the complaint, the Clouds sought and obtained an ex 
parte temporary restraining order which restrained the City from enforcing its fire code. 
(R. 199R.) 
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More than a month after suing the City and obtaining the TRO, the Clouds filed a 
notice of claim with the City. (R. 199R.)9 The notice of claim was filed by the Clouds as 
well as several other claimants. (R. 198K6-198L6; see also Add. 4.) The notice of claim 
did not mention the City's inspection of the Clouds' building or the non-issuance of the 
certificate of occupancy. {Id.) Rather, it dealt exclusively with concerns that the Clouds 
and other claimants had with water pressure in the City. (Id.) The notice of claim was 
also directed to the Washington County Water Conservancy District as a potential 
defendant. (Id.) 
In January 2004, the trial court held a hearing on the Clouds' application to 
continue its restraining order as a preliminary injunction. (R. 199R.) At the conclusion 
of the injunction hearing, and in response to the City's arguments that the contract claims 
were a fiction and that the City was otherwise immune from suit under Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act, the trial court—sua sponte—determined that the City's 
conduct violated the Clouds' rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, therefore, the Immunity 
Act provided no shield for the City. (R. 199S.) The trial court put it this way to the 
City's attorney: "That's why [§] 1983's there, Counsel. That's where the sword gets 
particularly sharp. Because we're dealing with a different theory entirely right now." (R. 
199S; see also R. 138C1 Tr. 190:3-5.) 
9
 A copy of the Notice of Claim is attached at Addendum 4. 
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D. The U.S. District Court Dissolves the Injunction and Grants 
Summary Judgment to the City. 
In February 2004, after enjoining the City from enforcing its fire code, the trial 
court granted the Clouds leave to amend their complaint to include three additional 
defendants,10 several new plaintiffs, and eight new causes of action, including formal 
addition of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as a takings claim. (R. 199S.) After 
the Clouds filed their amended complaint, the City immediately removed the case to the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah. (R. 199S.) The City then moved for 
summary judgment. (R. 199S.) 
On April 7, 2005, the United States District Court entered summary judgment in 
favor of the City on all federal claims asserted by the Clouds, including the Clouds' 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and takings claims. (R. 199S-199T (Add. 3); see also R. 138A-138M; 
Cloud v. Washington City, No. 2:04-CV-00246-PGC (D. Utah April 7, 2005). The U.S. 
District Court also dissolved the state trial court's injunction. (Id.)11 
Because all of the individually named defendants (Mike Shaw, Dwayne Isom, 
and Creig Maynes) were employed by Washington City, we simply refer to them as, 
collectively, "Washington City." 
11
 The U.S. District Court's decision to dissolve the injunction was immediately 
appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit as a matter of 
right. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) ("Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the 
United States . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions ..." 
are immediately appealable). The Clouds chose not to exercise that appeal right. 
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Having granted summary judgment to the City on the federal claims, the U.S. 
District Court reasoned: 
The only remaining claims are the Clouds' pendent state law contract, 
interference, conversion claims, and motion for attorney fees under the private 
attorney general doctrine. Since these remaining claims deal solely with state law, 
they are better left to the jurisdiction of the state courts. 
(R. 199T; Cloud v. Washington City, No. 2:04-CV-00246-PGC at 13 (D. Utah April 7, 
2005) (emphasis added).) These state law claims were then remanded back to the Fifth 
District Court for Washington County. (R. 199T.) 
E. A Belated Detour to the Fire Prevention Board. 
On remand back to the state trial court, the City moved for summary judgment on 
all remaining claims. (R. 199T.) But instead of ruling on the City's motion, the trial 
court—again, sua sponte and over the City's objections—stayed the litigation and 
referred the matter to the Utah Fire Prevention Board. (R. 199T.) This was nearly four 
years after the time had expired on the right to appeal Chief Isom's decision to the Fire 
Prevention Board. See Utah Admin. Code R710-9-16.2, -16.3 (2004) (appeal must be 
filed within 20 days after receiving decision). 
In January 2006, the Clouds received a hearing before the Fire Prevention Board. 
(R. 199T). The Fire Prevention Board ruled that the Clouds' building was not in 
compliance with the fire code at the time of the January 2002 inspection and therefore the 
City's "denial of a Certificate of Occupancy was based on a factually correct finding that 
the building was not in compliance with the 1997 Uniform Fire Code requirements." (R. 
199T-199U.) 
16 
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Nevertheless, the Fire Prevention Board also granted the Clouds a temporary 
certificate of occupancy for a one year period of time. (R. 199U.) During this time 
period, the Clouds were required to keep their storage below 12-feet in height; store only 
certain commodities; post appropriate signage; and do what was necessary to come into 
compliance with the fire code, at which time they would receive a permanent certificate 
of occupancy. (R. 199U.) 
Unsatisfied with this result, the Clouds petitioned for de novo review of the Fire 
Prevention Board's decision to the district court under the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-401, -402(l)(a) (2008) (re-codified from 63-
46b-14(1), -15(2)(a)). (R. 199U.) That de novo review action was consolidated into this 
case. (R. 199U.) With the matter back before the trial court, and with the trial court's 
self-imposed stay lifted, and with all fact discovery completed, the City again moved for 
summary judgment on the Clouds' remaining damages claims. (R. 197.) 
To be clear, the de novo appeal is nothing more than a review of a decision of an 
administrative agency—here, the Utah Fire Prevention Board. All proceedings before the 
Fire Prevention Board are informal adjudicative proceedings. See Utah Admin. Code 
R710-9-14.1 (2011) (designating proceedings as informal under Utah Code § 63G-4-
202). As such, appellate review of the Fire Prevention Board's decision is by trial de 
novo in the district court. See Utah Admin. Code R710-9-14.8 (2011); Utah Code Ann. § 
63G-4-402 (Supp. 2011). Most importantly, damages are not available to the Clouds 
under this administrative appeals process because there is no statute authorizing damages 
for the City's actions in this case. See id. § 63G-4-404(l)(a) (2008). In fact, as set forth 
in detail in this Brief, the Immunity Act provides the City with immunity from any 
damages for its actions in this case. 
i n 
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Instead of opposing that motion, the Clouds filed a motion under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(f). (R. 201-202.) Their Rule 56(f) motion, however, sought nothing 
more than to avoid the City's summary judgment motion and to proceed straight to a trial 
on the merits. (R. 201-203.) On February 23, 2011, the trial court issued an order 
denying the City's motion for summary judgment, granting the Clouds' Rule 56(f) 
motion, and ordering a trial within 60 days. (R. 215-215A.)13 
The City petitioned this Court for permission to take an interlocutory appeal of the 
trial court's February 23 Order. This Court granted the City's petition. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Lack of Jurisdiction: The Notice of Claim 
The Governmental Immunity Act requires anyone with a claim against a 
governmental entity to first file a notice of claim with the governmental entity. This 
notice must contain a brief statement of facts on which the claim is based, a statement of 
the nature of the claims asserted, and the damages sought by the claimant. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2), (3) (Supp. 2003). The notice of claim requirement is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to asserting the claims in a subsequent lawsuit against the 
governmental entity. Here, the Clouds' notice of claim did not address either the facts or 
actual tort claims that they are now pursuing against the City. This failure to strictly 
comply with the Immunity Act's notice of claim requirements strips the court of 
A copy of this order is attached at Addendum 2. 
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jurisdiction to entertain the claims and entitles the City to summary judgment. The trial 
court erred in concluding otherwise. 
2. Immunity from Suit 
Even assuming that one or more of the Clouds' tort claims survives the Immunity 
Act's procedural notice of claim requirements, the City is immune from suit for these 
claims. The Legislature has declared that governmental entities are immune from suit for 
any injury that "arises out of, in connection with, or results from" the refusal to issue a 
certificate of occupancy. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(3). Moreover, they are 
immune from suit for any "failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate 
inspection or negligent inspection." Id. § 63-30-10(4). 
Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have upheld this grant of immunity, 
reasoning that inspections to ensure compliance with building and fire codes and the 
issuance of permits as further assurance of such compliance are core governmental 
functions undertaken by government to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the 
general public. See DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 442 (Utah 1995); DeBry v. Salt Lake 
County, 835 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), affdsub nom. DeBry, 889 P.2d 428 
(Utah 1995). As such, government cannot be held liable for injuries resulting from these 
activities because to hold otherwise "could cause a breakdown in the enforcement of the 
statutory scheme and an overall loss in safety, rather than greater safety and protection." 
DeBry, 889 P.2d at 441. The Supreme Court put it simply: "Far more persons would 
suffer if government did not perform these functions at all than would be benefitted by 
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permitting recovery in those cases where the government is shown to have performed 
inadequately." Id. (emphasis, citations, and quotations omitted). 
The Clouds seek damages for the City's inspections of and non-issuance of a 
certificate of occupancy for a building that the City's fire chief determined did not meet 
the requirements of the fire code. Because the Clouds' claimed injuries arise out of, in 
connection with, or otherwise result from the City's exercise of core governmental 
functions as defined in the Immunity Act and explained in our case law, the City is 
immune from suit. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of summary judgment to the City 
was erroneous and must be reversed. 
3. The Fiction that Violates Public Policy 
The law is settled in Utah, municipal building and zoning permits do not create 
contractual obligations. See Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 11, Tfl[ 25-27, 
155 P.3d 900. And any argument to the contrary offends public policy. Id. % 27. The 
Clouds' breach of contract claim is premised on the argument that the building permit 
issued by the City is a contract. Because a building permit cannot create contractual 
obligations, the City is entitled to summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. 
And because a breach of good faith and fair dealing claim cannot stand without an 
underlying contract, the City is also entitled to summary judgment on the Clouds' breach 
of good faith and fair dealing claim. The trial court erred in denying summary judgment 
on these claims and must be reversed. 
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4. A Trial Court Lacks Discretion to do What the Appellate Courts 
Say it Cannot do. 
Finally, the trial court's inclusion of Rule 56(f) language in its order does not 
insulate its denial of the City's summary judgment motion nor change the applicable 
standards of review. The purpose for Rule 56(f) is singular: to allow a party who cannot 
present sufficient facts to oppose summary judgment more time to conduct discovery to 
procure facts to mount an opposition to summary judgment. See Crossland Sav. v. 
Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994). A Rule 56(f) motion that does not identify 
specific facts that the party intends to discover that would preclude entry of summary 
judgment is "futile" and must be denied. Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 
2008 UT 55, ffl[ 23-27, 192 P.3d 858. 
Here, the Clouds did not attempt any such showing. They did not seek to conduct 
any discovery—after all, it was seven years into the case and fact discovery was closed. 
Rather, the Clouds simply asked the trial court to deny the City's summary judgment 
motion and to send the case straight to trial. 
This Court has made clear that Rule 56(f) is not a device to defeat summary 
judgment and skip straight to trial as it cannot be used to protect a party from an adverse 
summary judgment ruling. "Importantly, 'a court should not grant a [rjule 56(f) motion 
to protect a party . . . from the merits of the motion for summary judgment.'" Jensen v. 
Smith, 2007 UT App 152, f 2, 163 P.3d 657 (quoting Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 
P.2d 556, 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). The trial court's decision did exactly what this 
Court said it cannot: Protect the Clouds from the City's summary judgment motion. 
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Not only was that decision untethered from the legal standards governing Rule 
56(f), it also put the Clouds' interests in the litigation above the Legislative will and the 
public interest by allowing the Clouds to escape their failure to file a proper notice of 
claim; to avoid having claims dismissed for which the City is immune from suit; and to 
otherwise keep alive a contract claim that is a fiction and an affront to the public safety, 
health, and welfare. Context matters in determining the limits of a trial court's Rule 56(f) 
discretion. See Overstock.com, Inc., 2008 UT 55, <| 21. In the context of this case, the 
trial court's decision exceeded the limits of reasonability. See Price Dev. Co. v. Or em 
City, 2000 UT 26, f 9, 995 P.2d 1237. 
Finally, to leave no question about the outcome, because the Clouds' certified with 
their Rule 56(f) motion that they have no facts to oppose summary judgment, and 
because the City demonstrated that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, 
this case cannot be remanded to allow the Clouds a second opportunity to oppose 
summary judgment. Rather, the Clouds went "all in" on Rule 56(f) and, accordingly, if 
the Court reverses the Rule 56(f) ruling—as it should—summary judgment must, 
inevitably, follow. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE CLOUDS' TORT CLAIMS ARE BARRED FOR FAILURE TO 
STRICTLY ADHERE TO THE IMMUNITY ACT'S NOTICE OF CLAIM 
REQUIREMENTS. 
A. The Pre-Suit Notice of Claim: A Jurisdictional Requirement. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("Immunity Act55)14 requires anyone with a 
claim for injury against a governmental entity to "file a written notice of claim with the 
entity before maintaining an action[]." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (Supp. 2003). The 
contents of the notice of claim must set forth: "(i) a brief statement of the facts; (ii) the 
nature of the claim asserted; and (iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they 
are known." Id § 63-30-1 l(3)(a) (Supp. 2003). 
"'There must be enough specificity in the notice to inform as to the nature of the 
claim so that the defendant can appraise its potential liability.5" Heideman v. Washington 
City, 2007 UT App 11,114, 155 P.3d 900 (quoting Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 
1129 (Utah 1990)). The notice of claim is not a recommendation. It is a mandatory 
requirement for which nothing less than strict compliance will suffice to vest a court with 
jurisdiction over a claim. See id.; see also Gurule v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 25, fflf 5-
In the 2004 General Session, the Legislature repealed and re-codified the 
Immunity Act. See S.B. 55, 55th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2004); see also H.B. 68, 57th 
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2008) (re-codifying Act to Title 63G, Chapter 7 of the Utah 
Code). However, because the alleged injuries in this case occurred prior to July 1, 2004, 
we apply the provisions of the former Immunity Act, contained in the now repealed Title 
63, Chapter 30 of the Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (repealed 
2004); Cook v. City of Moroni, 2005 UT App 40, \ 1 n.l, 107 P.3d 713. 
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8, 69 P.3d 1287 (reaffirming strict compliance with notice of claim requirements as 
jurisdictional prerequisite). 
What's more, given the jurisdictional nature of this requirement, it does not matter 
at all that the City may have actual notice of the claims; or that it has been litigating them 
for the better part of a decade. Failure to properly give notice of the claims in the notice 
of claim is a jurisdictional death knell that may be raised at any time, and cannot be 
waived by any party. See Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 2001 UT 109, ffl| 15-17, 37 
P.3d 1156 (holding that actual notice of a claim by a governmental entity does not excuse 
a claimant's lack of strict compliance with the requirements of the Immunity Act); 
Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[I]mproper notice divests 
the court of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to provide proper notice of claim is a non-
waivable defense that any party, or the court, can raise at any time."). As set forth below, 
the Clouds failed to adhere to these strict notice of claim requirements. 
B. The Clouds' Notice of Claim Does Not Give Notice of their Intent to 
Pursue any Tort Claims Related to the Inspection or Permitting of 
their Building. 
The only notice of claim that the Clouds filed with the City sets forth a statement 
of facts dealing exclusively with their "fear" about water pressure. It states: 
Washington City hired Sunrise Engineering to engineer water lines to surrounding 
community and commercial developments. Business owners in the Rio Virgin 
industrial park area have discovered that their water PSI levels fluctuate 
dramatically at various times. This fluctuation has significantly interfered with the 
business owners' operations. Furthermore, the business owners fear that there is 
insufficient water pressure should a fire erupt. Finally, it is believed that 
Washington City has the ability to control the pressure by use of valves or other 
94 
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means and that Washington City failed to install the correct size of pipe or valves 
in the system as designated in the original plans submitted by Sunrise Engineering. 
(R. 198K6-198L6; see also Add. 4 ("Notice of Claim").) As to the nature of the Clouds' 
claims, the notice asserts a claim for breach of contract, "§1983 claims in tort," and 
"Other causes of action." Id. 
This Notice of Claim bears no similarity to the facts at issue and claims asserted in 
this case: interference with economic relations and conversion arising from the City's 
fire code inspection and non-issuance of the certificate of occupancy. (R. 129P-129Q.) 
A claim for intentional interference with economic relations requires a showing that the 
City's alleged misconduct has damaged the Clouds' existing or potential economic 
relations with third parties. See Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 788 (Utah 1994). 
There is no reference to an interference cause of action in the Notice of Claim and no 
facts alleged that would even remotely support this cause of action. Indeed, the facts 
summarized in the Notice of Claim have nothing at all to do with an alleged interference 
with economic relations because of the City's inspections of the Clouds' building or non-
issuance of a certificate of occupancy. 
Nor does the Notice of Claim make reference, either express or implied, to a claim 
for conversion, which is "an act of wilful interference with a chattel, done without lawful 
justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession." 
Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fine. Servs. Inc., 1999 UT 13, If 20, 974 P.2d 288 (citations 
and quotations omitted). In fact, "a conversion does not occur until the defendant 
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exercises control over properly that is inconsistent with the plaintiffs right of possession 
to that property.5' Id. 
Fear about water pressure and the sizing of the pipes within the City's water 
system have nothing to do with depriving the Clouds of possession of their personal 
property. In fact, there is not the slightest indication in the Notice of Claim that the 
Clouds' claims have anything to do with the City allegedly exercising "possession" over 
their personal property (whatever it is)—and certainly nothing to suggest that this 
"unlawful possession" stemmed from the City's inspections or non-issuance of the 
certificate of occupancy. As with the interference claim, the conversion claim is simply a 
new claim charging new and different misconduct from what was asserted in the notice. 
That is not strict compliance with the Immunity Act's notice of claim requirements. See 
Yearsley, 798 P.2d at 1129; Heideman, 2007 UT App 11, If 14. 
Moreover, simply asserting in a notice, as the Clouds have here, that they may 
assert "other causes of action" does not provide a safe harbor to thereafter allege any 
claim in a complaint. That strategy was rejected by this Court in Heideman v. 
Washington City, 2007 UT App 11, ffif 13-14, 155 P.3d 900. There, like here, the 
plaintiffs included an interference claim in their complaint, but in their notice of claim 
simply listed claims for breach of contract, § 1983, and "other causes of action." Id. ^ 13. 
This Court affirmed summary judgment for the City on the notice issue, reasoning that 
because the notice of claim failed to indicate that the plaintiffs "intended to pursue an 
intentional interference with economic relations claim," it was fatally deficient. Id. *!j 14. 
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The Clouds' claims in this case—which follow the same template as the deficient notice 
in Heideman—must suffer the same fate. 
C. The Notice of Claim was Never Intended to Address the 
Facts and Claims in this Case. 
Further demonstrating that the Notice of Claim has nothing to do with this case is 
the fact that the Clouds sued the City in a separate case over the water pressure facts and 
claims identified in their Notice of Claim. See Cloud v. Washington City, No. 2:04-CV-
266-TS, 2005 WL 1501439 (D. Utah June 23, 2005) (R. 200P3-200S3.)15 That case 
resulted in a favorable decision for the City in federal court. See id. 
What's more, the Notice of Claim names the Washington County Water 
Conservancy District as a potential defendant and includes various other claimants in 
addition to the Clouds (Fred Buksa, Mary Buksa, F&M Steel Services, Inc., Jarl 
Klungervik, A. Kent Cottam, and JKR Development, Inc.). The water conservancy 
district has nothing to do with this case. Nor do the other claimants listed in the Notice of 
Claim. None of these individuals or entities was involved in any way with the inspection 
of the Clouds' building or the non-issuance of the certificate of occupancy. Rather, these 
were co-plaintiffs in the failed water pressure litigation in federal court. In this light, it is 
not plausible to argue that the Notice of Claim was even meant for the facts and issues in 
this case. 
* * * 
A copy of this decision is provided at Addendum 5. 
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In sum, the Notice of Claim does not strictly comply with the Immunity Act's 
notice of claim requirements. Therefore, the trial court is—and always has been— 
without subject matter jurisdiction over the Clouds' tort claims. Accordingly, the trial 
court erred in denying the City's motion for summary judgment and retaining jurisdiction 
over these claims. See Heideman, 2007 UT App 11, ^ 14. This Court should reverse. 
II. DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT. 
Even if this Court determines that the Clouds' tort claims survive the Immunity 
Act's notice of claim requirements (and it should not), it does not change the result 
because the substantive protections in the Immunity Act bar these claims.16 
16
 There is a three part test to determine whether a governmental entity is immune 
from suit: "(1) the activity giving rise to the plaintiffs claim served a governmental 
function; (2) governmental immunity is not waived for the particular activity; or (3) if 
immunity is waived for a particular activity, the activity falls under an applicable 
exception to that waiver." Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, f 6, 173 
P.3d 166. The focus here is the third prong of the test, as there is no question that the 
activities here—inspections and permitting—are governmental functions under the first 
prong. Further, while the City does not concede the second prong, we merely assume so 
for purposes of summary judgment and this analysis. See Wilkinson v. Washington City, 
2010 UT App 56, If 9 n.8, 230 P.3d 136 (noting that for purposes of summary judgment, 
the City may assume, without conceding, the second prong of three part test); City of 
Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency, 2010 UT 38, \ 23, 233 P.3d 461 (recognizing that 
the filing of a summary judgment is not a concession on any claim alleged). 
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A. The Immunity Act Provides Immunity for the City's Inspections and 
its Non-Issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy. 
The Immunity Act retains governmental immunity for any injury that "arises out 
of, in connection with, or results from: 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the 
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate 
or negligent inspection; 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-10(3), (4) (Supp. 2003).17 
Furthermore, a determination of immunity focuses on the conduct or situation out 
of which the claimed injury arose, "'not the theory of liability crafted by the plaintiff or 
the type of negligence alleged.'55 Bullock v. State ex rel. Dep't of Tramp., 966 P.2d 1215, 
1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Ledfors v. Emery County Sck Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 
1166 (Utah 1993)). Thus, in determining immunity, courts look to whether "the injury 
asserted 'arose out of conduct or a situation specifically described in one of the subparts 
of 63-30-10; if it did, then immunity is preserved.55 Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1166. And 
courts must "reject[] claims that... reflect[] attempts to evade these statutory categories 
by recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury.55 Id. 
Here, the Clouds seek damages they claim to have suffered from the City's failure 
to issue a permit (the certificate of occupancy); the approval process through which their 
1 7 
These sections remain unchanged in the current version of the Immunity Act. 
See Utah Code Arm. §§ 63G-7-301(5)(c), (d) (2008). 
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plans and applications were reviewed and approved; and the inspection process 
culminating in the fire chiefs inspection of their building, thereby resulting in the City's 
non-issuance of the certificate of occupancy. The plain language of the foregoing 
provisions of the Immunity Act encompasses all of the actions on which the Clouds' tort 
claims—on which their alleged injuries—are premised. 
Subsection 10(3) encompasses any tort claim arising out of the non-issuance of the 
certificate of occupancy because it preserves immunity if the alleged injury "arises out of, 
in connection with, or results from" the issuance, denial, or refusal to issue "any permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(3). The remainder of the allegations supporting the Clouds' tort claims all relate to 
the inspections for the building and are therefore covered by subsection 10(4), which 
preserves immunity if the alleged injury "arises out of, in connection with, or results 
from" the failure to make an inspection or "an inadequate or negligent inspection." Id. § 
63-30-10(4). 
In short, it doesn't matter what labels the Clouds attach to their tort claims. 
Because the Clouds alleged injuries arise out of, in connection with, or result from 
activities for which the City retains immunity, the City is "immune from suit[.]" Id. § 63-
30-10 (Supp. 2003). The trial court erred in concluding otherwise by denying summary 
judgment to the City. This Court should reverse. 
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B. Governing Case Law Confirms the City's Immunity. 
Not only does the Immunity Act's plain language mandate immunity for the City, 
case law applying these provisions confirms that result and explains the reason behind it. 
See DeBry v. Salt Lake County, 835 P.2d 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), affdsub nom. 
DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995). The seminal cases examining inspections 
and permitting under the Immunity Act are the DeBry decisions issued by this Court and 
the Utah Supreme Court, respectively. In fact, DeBry is factually analogous to our case. 
It involved the construction of a commercial building in Salt Lake County. See DeBry v. 
Salt Lake County, 835 P.2d 981, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The County was involved at 
the outset of the construction process. See id. It conducted various inspections of the 
building and, based upon these inspections as well as information provided by the 
builder, issued various permits for the construction, including a temporary certificate of 
occupancy for the building. See id. The plaintiffs purchased and took possession of the 
building, apparently relying on the fact that the County had issued approvals, conducted 
inspections, and issued a temporary certificate of occupancy. See id. 
But after issuing the temporary certificate of occupancy, the County discovered 
that it had never actually issued a building permit authorizing construction in the first 
instance. See id. at 983. The County then performed additional inspections which 
revealed persisting defects in the building. See id. The County advised the plaintiffs that 
it would not issue a permanent certificate of occupancy unless the specific defects were 
cured within a thirty day period. See id. In fact, the plaintiffs own inspection revealed 
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"serious violations of the uniform building code"—violations the County's own 
inspections did not catch before allowing occupancy of the building. Id. Given the 
nature of the violations, the plaintiffs could not timely comply. See id. As a result, the 
County ordered them to vacate the building within ten days. See id. 
The plaintiffs pursued an administrative appeal requesting more time to come into 
compliance with the building code. See id. That appeal was rejected. See id. Seemingly 
out of options, the plaintiffs sued the County and its building official for 
misrepresentation, fraud, negligence, gross negligence, and violation of the plaintiffs' 
constitutional rights. See id. The gravaman of the complaint was that the County and its 
inspector had failed to conduct proper inspections; that the County failed to require the 
builder to comply with the building code, including obtaining a building permit; and that 
the County improperly issued a certificate of occupancy to the builder for the building, on 
which the plaintiffs relied when they contracted to purchase the building. See id. at 983, 
986-87; DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 430-31 (Utah 1995). 
The County responded that these were governmental functions for which it had 
immunity. See 835 P.2d at 983. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment 
for the County. See id. This Court affirmed, holding that the County and the building 
officials were immune from suit: 
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[W]e reaffirm that the issuance of permits and certificates of occupancy, and the 
administering of building inspections as identified by the legislature in section 63-
30-10 are "core" governmental functions. Moreover, the county's negligent acts 
or omissions relating to those functions are expressly excepted from waiver of 
immunity under the governmental immunity statute, section 63-30-10. Therefore, 
the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment and ruling that Salt Lake 
County was immune from suit for its performance of those "core" functions. 
Id. at 987. 
The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. See DeBry v. Noble, 889 
P.2d at 441. Turning away the plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of the grant of 
immunity, our Supreme Court refused to accept the argument that the imposition of tort 
liability would result in the County exercising greater care in the future. See id. at 441. 
In fact, it determined that imposition of tort liability would have the opposite effect: 
"public safety would not be furthered by tort liability for negligence in the governmental 
activity involved in this case. Liability for negligent enforcement of building code 
provisions could cause a breakdown in the enforcement of the statutory scheme and an 
overall loss in safety, rather than greater safety and protection." Id. at 441. 
Enforceable building standards, the Court continued, are "designed to protect the 
entire community." Id. at 442. And "[t]he issuance of permits is integral to assuring 
compliance with building code standards." Id. As a result, while a few may be left 
without a remedy, that is the tradeoff that the Legislature has made to ensure protection 
of the health, safety, and welfare of the general public and community at large: 
"
£[I]f liability existed for this type of activity, the risk exposure to which a public 
entity would be subject would include virtually all activities going on within the 
community. There would be potential governmental liability for all building 
defects, for all crimes, and for all outbreaks of contagious disease. No private 
i i 
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person is subjected to risks of this magnitude.... Far more persons would suffer if 
government did not perform these functions at all than would be benefitted by 
permitting recovery in those cases where the government is shown to have 
performed inadequately."' . 
Id. at 441 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gillman v. Dep't of Fine. Institutions, 782 P.2d 
506, 512-13 (Utah 1989) (quotation omitted)). 
That, of course, is the purpose for immunity. Just as government"'should not be 
liable for failure to make arrests or otherwise to enforce any law[,] [tjhey should not be 
liable for failing to inspect persons or property adequately to determine compliance with 
health and safety regulations. Nor should they be liable for negligent or wrongful 
issuance or revocation of licenses and permits.'" Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Gillman, 782 P.2d at 512-13 (quotation omitted)). The reason for this simple: '"The 
government has undertaken these activities to insure public health and safety. To provide 
the utmost public protection, government entities should not be dissuaded from engaging 
in such activities by the fear that liability may be imposed if an employee performs his 
duties inadequately.'" Id. 
The Clouds' claims fall squarely under sections 63-30-10(3) and -10(4) of the 
Immunity Act and the principles expressed in DeBry. The Clouds have sued the City 
because, as in DeBry, they claim the City allowed for completion of construction without 
conducting an adequate inspection for code compliance. And, as in DeBry, the City was 
involved from the outset of the construction process, performing various building 
inspections but never catching any violation until the building was completed and the 
Clouds had expended funds in anticipation of occupancy. And, as in DeBry, the City 
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refused to issue a final certificate of occupancy until the Clouds brought the building into 
code compliance. And, as in DeBry, the Clouds were given time to but did not come into 
compliance. Regardless of how the Clouds and the trial court view the City's care or 
judgment in its actions towards the Clouds during the approval and inspection process, 
the City undertakes these functions to provide the utmost public protection. That 
includes protecting the Clouds from occupying a building that is not fire code compliant. 
Therefore, the City should not and cannot be held liable for performing any of these 
functions inadequately. See DeBry, 889 P.2d at 441. Rather, as in DeBry, the City is 
immune from suit. 
III. MUNICIPAL ZONING AND BUILDING PERMITS DO NOT CREATE 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS. 
A. A Building Permit is Not a Contract. 
The Clouds have sued the City for breach of contract, claiming that the building 
permit the City issued to them is a contract that the City breached by requiring the 
Clouds' building to comply with the fire code. (R. 129, 129C-129D; Am. Compl. ffif 23, 
26-31.) This "contract" claim is (and always has been) without merit. 
Municipal zoning and building permits do not create contractual obligations. See 
Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 11, fflf 25, 27, 155 P.3d 900. A building 
permit issued by a municipality possesses none of the characteristics of a contract: 
"While the terms of a permit may be summarily changed, modified, or revoked by the 
issuer, the terms of a contract are binding and may not be altered or revoked absent the 
mutual agreement of the parties." Trevino & Gonzalez Co. v. R.F. Muller Co., 949 
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S.W.2d 39, 42 (Tex. App. 1997). Furthermore, "when a building permit is issued, none 
of the elements of a contract are present. There is no offer, no acceptance, and no 
consideration. A building permit is simply a revocable and alterable license authorizing 
construction." Id. 
And, unlike when two parties enter into an agreement, there is nothing voluntary 
about getting a building permit. The purpose of a building permit "is to ensure that 
appropriate buildings are constructed in a manner and means approved by the 
municipality. The application for an issuance of a building permit does not constitute a 
voluntary agreement between the parties to enter into a binding contract." Id. 
In Heideman, this Court adopted the Trevino court's reasoning. See 2007 UT App 
11, If 25 (citing Trevino, 949 S.W.2d at 42). But this Court didn't stop at the basic 
contract elements. It went further, recognizing that the distinction between permits and 
contracts is not only conceptual, there is also public policy component which underlies it: 
"[I]f the issuance of a permit, or, as is the case here, the acceptance of a fee were to create 
a 'binding obligation ... the City's ability to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the 
public would be seriously hampered.'" Heideman, 2007 UT App 11, Tf 27 (quoting 
Patzer v. City ofLoveland, 80 P.3d 908, 911 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003)). 
Simply stated, the Clouds' contract claim is a fiction that "offends public policy." 
Id. The trial court erred in concluding otherwise and denying the City summary 
judgment. This Court should reverse. 
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B. Without an Underlying Contract, the Clouds' Breach of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing Claim Fails as a Matter of Law. 
"Any claim for breach of contract must be predicated on the existence of an 
express or implied contract...." Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, f 31, 99 P.3d 842. 
Because there is no contract between the Clouds and the City, the Clouds' breach of good 
faith and fair dealing claim fails as a matter of law. See Heideman, 2007 UT App 11, f 
27 n.15 (affirming dismissal of good faith and fair dealing claim because there was no 
underlying contract between the parties). Here, too, the trial court erred and should be 
reversed.18 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S INCLUSION OF RULE 56(f) LANGUAGE IN ITS 
ORDER DOES NOT INSULATE ITS DENIAL OF THE CITY'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION. 
The Clouds never opposed the City's summary judgment motion. Instead, they 
filed a Rule 56(f) motion, which the trial court then wielded to summarily deny the City's 
summary judgment motion and order the parties to trial. But the trial court's inclusion of 
Rule 56(f) language in its order does not insulate its denial of the City's summary 
judgment motion nor change the applicable standards of review. A denial of summary of 
18
 The last "damages" claim standing is the Clouds' claim for attorney fees under 
the "private attorney general" doctrine. (R. 1290.) This is a doctrine under which a 
plaintiff may recover attorney fees for vindicating the rights of society. See Stewart v. 
Public Serv. Comm 'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782-83 (Utah 1994). A claim for fees under this 
doctrine cannot stand alone. As a threshold matter, an award of fees under this doctrine 
requires that a plaintiff first prevail on the merits of its underlying claims. See Shipman 
v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, f 27 n.6, 100 P.3d 1151. Therefore, dismissal of the Clouds' 
substantive claims mandates dismissal of their claim for fees under the private attorney 
general doctrine. [The Legislature has since abolished this doctrine. See Utah Code Ann. 
§78B~5-825.5(Supp.2011).] 
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judgment is reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court's decision. 
See Orvis, 2008 UT 2,16. As demonstrated above, the trial court erred in denying 
summary judgment to the City. That should end it, notwithstanding the Rule 56(f) 
component of the order. However, to the extent that Rule 56(f) remains relevant, it does 
not change the outcome. 
This is so for three principal reasons. First, the trial court impermissibly used Rule 
56(f) as a device to protect the Clouds from summary judgment and force the case to 
trial. Second, in the context of this case, Rule 56(f) was impermissibly used to avoid 
confronting threshold jurisdictional and immunity questions—all of which were based on 
undisputed facts. Finally, the Clouds' Rule 56(f) motion was their certification that they 
had no facts to dispute the City's summary judgment motion, making summary judgment 
a certainty. 
A. Rule 56(f) is Not a Device to Protect a Party From Summary 
Judgment. 
"Importantly, a court should not grant a [rjule 56(f) motion to protect a 
party... from the merits of the motion for summary judgment. " 
— Jensen v. Smith, 
2007 UT App 152, f 2, 163 P.3d 657 
The purpose for Rule 56(f) is singular: to allow a party who cannot present 
sufficient facts to oppose summary judgment more time to conduct discovery to procure 
specific facts to mount an opposition to summary judgment. See Crossland Sav. v. 
Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994). Thus, to obtain Rule 56(f) relief, the party 
requesting the continuance must identify specific facts that he or she intends to discover 
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that would preclude entry of summary judgment. See Overstock.com, Inc. v. 
SmartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55, fflf 23-27, 192 P.3d 858.19 A motion that fails to 
identify such facts is "futile" and must be denied. Id. f 23. See also Energy Mgmt. 
Servs., L.L.C. v. Shaw, 2005 UT App 90, If 11, 110 P.3d 158 (reasoning that to have 
merit, a Rule 56(f) motion must propose discovery that "targets core issues that might 
defeat the pending summary judgment motion"); Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 
P.2d 838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (party seeking Rule 56(f) continuance "must... 
explain how the continuance will aid [their] opposition to summary judgment"). 
To that end, this Court has made clear that Rule 56(f) is not a device to protect a 
party from an adverse summary judgment ruling: "Importantly, 'a court should not grant 
a [r]ule 56(f) motion to protect a party ... from the merits of the motion for summary 
judgment.'" Jensen v. Smith, 2007 UT App 152, ^  2, 163 P.3d 657 (quoting Jones v. 
Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). And the liberality with 
which Rule 56(f) motions are generally viewed has no application if the motion is 
"'lacking in merit.'" Id. (quoting Reeves v. Geigy Pharm., Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989)). That is, no trial court has discretion to grant a Rule 56(f) motion that 
substantively fails to meet established legal standards. See generally State v. Pena, 869 
19
 To qualify for relief under Rule 56(f), the party opposing summary judgment 
"must show to the best of his [or her] ability what facts are within the movant's exclusive 
knowledge or control; what steps have been taken to obtain the desired information 
pursuant to discovery procedures under the Rules; and that she is desirous of taking 
advantage of these discovery procedures." Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debry, 2001 
UT App 397, \ 9, 38 P.3d 984 (quoting Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 
840-41 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quotation omitted)). 
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P.2d 932, 937-38 (Utah 1994) (appellate courts set the legal parameters in which trial 
courts exercise their discretion), rev yd in part on other grounds by State v. Levin, 2006 
UT50, 144 P.3d 1096. 
Here, the Clouds did not address a single substantive Rule 56(f) standard in the 
motion they put before the trial court. (R. 201-203B.) They did not seek discovery. (Id.) 
They did not identify a single fact that they hoped to find that could be used to defeat 
summary judgment. (Id.) They did not even address the actual issues and arguments 
advanced in the City's summary judgment motion. (Id.) They did not because they 
could not. 
Instead, the Clouds told the trial court, in the most general of terms, in essence, 
"let's just to go trial and see what happens." Setting aside the fact that the Clouds did not 
seek discovery or identify specific facts they could use to defeat summary judgment, the 
outcome of any trial—whether a de novo review of the Fire Prevention Board or 
otherwise—cannot save the Clouds from their failure to comply with the Immunity Act's 
notice of claim requirements; cannot amend the substantive provisions of the Immunity 
20
 The City's summary judgment motion was not filed early in the litigation before 
discovery had occurred. It was filed after seven years of litigation and a full opportunity 
for discovery. And the City's motion could come as no surprise to the Clouds because 
the City had been making the same arguments since the inception of the case—only to be 
presented with one obstacle after another. Moreover, the City's motion was not based on 
one party's affidavit and did not present the trial court with dueling affidavits. It was 
based mainly on deposition testimony—primarily the Clouds' own deposition testimony 
and prior affidavits. (R. 199K-199U.) The Clouds could not oppose the City's motion 
because the facts were what the City said they were, and the law applied to those facts 
mandated judgment for the City. 
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Act to make the City liable in tort; and cannot reverse this Court's decision in Heideman 
to create contractual obligations where none existed before. 
Simply put, the Clouds asked the trial court to do exactly what this Court said it 
cannot do: Protect them from the merits of the City's summary judgment motion. See 
Jensen, 2007 UT App 152, f 2. The trial court's decision to grant that request, by any 
measure, was untethered from the legal standards governing Rule 56(f). At once, the trial 
court's decision exceeded the limits of reasonability, see Price Dev. Co. v. Or em City, 
2000 UT 26,19, 995 P.2d 1237, as well as the legal boundaries set by this Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court for deciding Rule 56(f) motions. Stated differently, the trial court 
abused its discretion in granting the Clouds' Rule 56(f) motion. See id; see also Pena, 
869 P.2d 937-38. 
B. Governmental Entities are Entitled to Have Basic Immunity and 
Jurisdictional Issues Determined, 
There is an additional problem with the trial court's Rule 56(f) decision that 
further demonstrates the trial court's abuse of discretion: it continued a pattern of 
outright avoidance of confronting basic jurisdictional and immunity questions. The 
"limits of reasonability" standard with which Rule 56(f) orders are reviewed "is based on 
the specific circumstances of each case—there is not a 'bright line' test for determining 
whether the district court abused its discretion." Overstock.com, Inc., 2008 UT 55,121. 
In other words, context matters. 
The U.S. District Court remanded the case back to the trial court with only the 
Clouds' tort and contract claims in tow. The City presented a summary judgment motion 
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squarely addressing these claims. The trial court previously avoided addressing the 
matters presented by the City's summary judgment motion by utilizing 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
But § 1983 is now off the table. What's more5 the issues raised by the City's motion 
were not inconsequential. As detailed above, they involve threshold questions of 
jurisdiction, immunity, and otherwise implicate the public health, safely, and welfare. 
There was simply no impediment to confronting the merits of the City's motion—thereby 
forcing the Clouds to actually defend the very claims they chose to bring against the City. 
Where, as here, government raises a threshold jurisdictional question as to whether 
there is a proper notice of claim; and where, as here, the facts are not in dispute; and 
where, as here, the plaintiff can identify no facts that it hopes to discover which bear on 
the jurisdictional question, there is no reasonable basis for granting a Rule 56(f) motion 
thereby avoiding these issues. If a court is without jurisdiction over a claim, it has no 
choice but to dismiss the claim. See Heideman, 2007 UT App 11, ^ 14. And it exceeds 
the limits of reasonability for a trial court to flat refuse to confront a threshold 
jurisdictional question under the cover of Rule 56(f). 
Moreover, even assuming jurisdiction, substantive immunity imposes an 
additional bar to the Clouds' tort claims. To be clear, immunity under Utah's Immunity 
Act is—as it plainly states—an immunity "from suit," not mere immunity from liability. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 2003). See also Mecham v. Frazier, 2008 UT 60, ffif 
11, 13, 193 P.3d 630 (holding Immunity Act is an "immunity from suit," not mere 
immunity from liability). Immunity from suit is the unfettered, undisputed right not to 
42 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
stand trial. See Smith v. Rogers Group, Inc., 72 S.W.3d 450, 460 (Ark. 2002) (immunity 
from suit is the "entitlement not to stand trial, while immunity from liability is a mere 
defense to a suit"). "[Ijmmunity from suit means that a plaintiff cannot legally file a 
lawsuit naming the [governmental] entity as a defendant." State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 
507 (Colo. 2000). 
As such, immunity questions should be resolved "'at the earliest possible stage in 
litigation[,]555 because it is an "'entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of 
litigation'55 that is "'effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.555 
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-201 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 
511, 525-26 (1985)). As explained by the United States Supreme Court, the burdens of a 
trial on governmental entities are not limited to monetary expenses. See Mitchell, All 
U.S. at 526. They include '"the general costs of subjecting [public] officials to the risks 
of trial—distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of 
discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service.555 Id. (quoting 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982)). 
For precisely these reasons, the City has been asking for resolution of these 
immunity issues since the inception of this litigation over seven years ago. As with the 
jurisdictional issue, where (as here), the facts are undisputed, discovery closed, and the 
plaintiff—after seven years of litigation—can identify nothing that would demonstrate 
that its tort claims did not arise out of, in connection with, or result from activities for 
which the city is immune, a trial court must deny the plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion and 
A1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
carry out the Legislative will, as expressed in the Immunity Act. See, e.g., Carter v. 
Univ. of Utah, 2006 UT 78, ^ j 10, 150 P.3d 467 (maintenance of a cause of action against 
a government entity is only allowed as a statutory exception to Doctrine of Sovereign 
Immunity); Heideman, 2007 UT App 11, <f 14 ("[T]he ability to sue the government is a 
statutorily created exception to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity.") (citation and 
quotation omitted). So it is here. There is no reasonable basis to force the City to remain 
entrenched in litigation on claims which are stillborn as a result of the Legislature's 
decision to provide the City with immunity from suit. 
This leaves the contract claim. As detailed above, the contract claim is a fiction. 
Not only that, but it's a fiction that offends public policy and hampers the "'City's ability 
to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public .... '" Heideman, 2007 UT App 11, 
^ 27 (quoting Patzer, 80 P.3d at 911). But it was solely on the strength of this contract 
claim that the trial court took the extraordinary step of issuing an ex parte TRO 
restraining the City from enforcing its fire code. In fact, the trial court—as required by 
Rule 65A(e)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure—determined at the outset of the 
case that the Clouds were likely to prevail on the merits of the contract claim. (R. 8 A.) 
Yet, over seven years later, with fact discovery complete, the trial court still was not 
prepared to require the Clouds to actually demonstrate a triable issue of fact on the claim. 
The Clouds could not because there isn't one. 
Against these jurisdictional, immunity, and public health, safety, and welfare 
concerns, the trial court simply accepted the Clouds' explanation of how the case should 
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proceed—an explanation that amounted to this: "Let's just go to trial and see what 
happens." In the context of this case, the trial court's acceptance of the Clouds' excuse 
exceeded the limits of reasonability. 
C. The Clouds Went "All In" with their Rule 56(f) Motion, Thereby 
Conceding Summary Judgment to the City. 
Finally, to leave no question about the outcome, the Clouds' decision to file a Rule 
56(f) motion concedes summary judgment to the City. A Rule 56(f) motion constitutes a 
certification that a party is not in a position to present "facts essential to justify the party's 
opposition" to a pending summary judgment motion. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). For this 
reason, a Rule 56(f) motion must be accompanied by an affidavit certifying why a party 
can't oppose summary judgment. See Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. DeBry, 2001 UT 
App397,f 9, 38P.3d984. 
Here, the Clouds have certified through their attorney's sworn affidavit (R. 203) 
that they have no facts to justify an opposition to summary judgment. Therefore, a 
reversal of the trial court's grant of the Clouds' Rule 56(f) motion should result in an 
award of summary judgment to the City. That is, a reversal of the Rule 56(f) aspect of 
the trial court's order should not give the Clouds the opportunity to go back and oppose 
summary judgment. That door is closed. 
Rule 56(f) is not alternative pleading of legal theories nor is it a means through 
which a party is granted additional time to respond to the summary judgment motion after 
the close of discovery. Rather, Rule 56(f) is an "all in" strategy—a party's affirmative 
representation to the trial court that the party cannot oppose summary judgment. Thus, if 
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Rule 56(f) relief is not appropriate, summary judgment should follow. See, e.g., 
CrosslandSav., 877 P.2d at 1243 n.5 (affirming trial court's immediate entry of summary 
judgment after it denied the defendant's Rule 56(f) motion). 
To interpret the Rule in any other fashion is counterintuitive. It would mean that a 
party can represent initially that it has no facts available to it to oppose summary 
judgment but then throw that representation overboard and contest summary judgment on 
the merits or otherwise claim a material issue of disputed fact when the Rule 56(f) motion 
is rejected. These two positions cannot co-exist. 
As explained in our case law, the only caveats prior to entering summary judgment 
when the opposing party files a Rule 56(f) motion is to allow for complete briefing on the 
Rule 56(f) motion, see CrosslandSav., 877 P.2d at 1243 n.5, and to otherwise review the 
summary judgment motion itself to ensure that summary judgment is warranted as a 
matter of law, see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Ward v. Graydon, 2011 UT App 358, ffi| 15-16. 
The Clouds decided to go "all in." Having presented the trial court with a Rule 
56(f) motion—along with an affidavit from their attorney swearing under oath that the 
Clouds could not oppose summary judgment—instead of a single argument in opposition 
to summary judgment, the Clouds certified that they could not oppose the City's 
summary judgment motion. After making that representation, the Court cannot permit 
them to return to the trial court to now claim that, on second thought, they actually are in 
a position to oppose summary judgment or to dispute the material facts presented therein. 
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The Clouds' Rule 56(f) motion was fully briefed. And, as set forth in detail above, 
the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, a decision by this Court 
that the trial court erred in granting the Clouds' Rule 56(f) motion should terminate the 
litigation in total because if the Court reverses the Rule 56(f) ruling—as it should— 
summary judgment must, inevitably, follow. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order should be reversed and the matter remanded with 
instructions to the trial court to enter judgment for the City on all damages claims 
asserted in the case, thereby leaving the de novo review of the Fire Prevention Board's 
decision as the only live controversy remaining before the trial court. 
DATED THIS _JJ day of November 2011. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
BRYAN J. PATTISON 
Attorneys for Washington City 
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ADDENDUM 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
UTAH CODE § 63-30-11 
Notice of Claim 
UTAH CODE § 63-30-11 (1997) (repealed 2004), provides, in relevant part: 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or against 
its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized 
as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, 
parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an incorporated 
city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when 
the claim is against a school district or board of education; 
(D) the president or secretary of the board, when the claim is against a 
special district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of Utah; or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or 
executive secretary, when the claim is against any other public board, 
commission, or body. 
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U T A H C O D E § 63-30-10 
Waiver of Immunity; Exceptions 
UTAH CODE § 63-30-10 (Supp. 2003) (repealed 2004), provides, in relevant part: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope 
of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results 
from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with 
contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, 
order, or similar authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent 
inspection; 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PHILLIP CLOUD, an individual, DEBRA 
CLOUD, aka DEBBIE CLOUD, an individual 
and SHAWN CLOUD, an individual, 
CLOUD ENTERPRISES, INC., an expired 
corporation, CLOUD MOVING CO., INC., a 
Utah corporation, and CLOUD FAMILY 
PROPERTIES, L.L.C., a limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WASHINGTON CITY, INC., CRAIG 
MAYNES, MIKE SHAW, DWAYNEISOM, 
Washington City Fire Chief, and 10 unknown 
persons working for or under the authority of 
Washington City, Inc., 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR RULE 56(f) 
CONTINUANCE AND DENYING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 030501521 
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( 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on November 12, 2010, pursuant to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance. 
Both Plaintiffs and Defendants were represented by their respective counsel of record at said 
hearing, and counsel for both Plaintiffs and Defendants made argument to the Court on their 
respective Motions. Now therefore, the Court having reviewed the file and the evidence 
contained therein, having heard oral argument as presented by counsel for both Plaintiffs and 
Defendants, and being otherwise fully informed in the premises, 
HEREBY ORDERS AND DECREES as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance is granted. 
2. Defendants'Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
3. The de novo trial of Plaintiffs' claims on the merits shall be set within sixty (60) 
days of the date of this Order, or as soon thereafter as is practical. 
4. This matter is hereby bifurcated such that the issue of damages on Plaintiff* s 
claims is reserved and if necessary will be heard at a later date as soon as practicable following 
the de novo trial. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 
f-Jt-2-Bll 
day of D^ceffifeer^ 2JM-9T^ 
By the Court: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Order - Page 2 of 3 
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF. UTAH -
CENTRAL DIVISION ' 
PHILLIP CLOUD, an individual, DEBRA 
CLOUD aka DEBBIE CLOUD, an 
individual, SHAWN CLOUD, an individual, 
CLOUD ENTERPRISES, INC., an expired 
corporation, CLOUD MOVING CO., INC., a 
Utah corporation, and CLOUD FAMILY 
PROPERTIES, L.L.C., a limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WASHINGTON CITY, INC., CRAIG 
MAYNES, MIKE SHAW, DWAYNE ISOM, 
Washington City Fire Chief, and 10 unknown 
persons working for or under the authority of 
Washington City, Inc., 
Defendants. 
" •" ' ''•>—-K \ 
• ' ••~tt 
• • ; " . . • ' • ' i^-
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
0 3OSDlS2-\ 
Case No. 2:04-CV-00246-PGC 
This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants 
Washington City, Inc.'s, Craig Maynes's, Mike Shaw's, and Dwayne Isom's (collectively, the 
"City"). Plaintiffs Phillip Cloud, Debra Cloud, Shawn Cloud, Cloud Enterprises, Inc., Cloud 
Moving Co., and Cloud Family Properties (collectively, the "Clouds") originally filed this action 
in state court. After the Clouds amended their complaint and inserted federal claims under 42 
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U.S.C. § 1983, the City removed the case to this court. The court finds that summary judgment 
for Clouds' § 1983 claims is appropriate, except that the court does not grant summary judgment 
on the takings claim but rather dismisses it without prejudice for lack of ripeness. As to the 
Clouds' remaining state claims, the City's motion is denied based on the court's refusal to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those remaining claims. Consequently, those state claims 
axe dismissed without prejudice and remanded to state court. 
BACKGROUND 
For the purpose of resolving the City's motion for summary judgment, the court finds the 
following facts to be undisputed. The Clouds owns Lots 206 and 207 in the Rio Virgin Industrial 
Park, Phase II, in Washington City, Utah. The Clouds planned to develop the property for a 
moving and storage business and obtained a conditional use permit from the Washington City 
Planning Commission. The City later issued a building permit to the Clouds for an 
approximately 10,000 square foot storage and moving facility on the property. The plans 
submitted to the City did not include an automatic fire sprinkling system, and the building permit 
did not expressly include an automatic fire sprinkling system requirement. The Clouds began 
construction in July 10, 2001. During construction of the building, various city building officials 
conducted inspections. None of the officials mentioned adding an automatic fire sprinkling 
system. In January 2002, the City asked Fire Chief Dwayne Isom to inspect the building for 
compliance with the fire code. Chief Isom determined that the Clouds' building constituted a 
high-piled combustible storage area under § 8101.2.2 of the Uniform Fire Code and required an 
automatic sprinkling system. In light of Chief Isom's conclusion that the Clouds7 building did 
not meet fire code requirements, the City refused to issue the Certificate of Occupancy. 
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Thereinafter, the Clouds filed this action in the Fifth District Court for the State of Utah. 
The state court granted a preliminary injunction for the Clouds. The state court found 
that the City acknowledged that the enforcement of this provision of the fire code is selective and 
that neighboring businesses on the same street in the same industrial park development were not 
required to receive sprinkler systems in order to get certificates of occupancy. The state court 
concluded that the City violated the Clouds' due process rights and that the Clouds incurred 
substantial loss because of their reliance upon the City's representations. Soon after the state 
court's decision, the Clouds amended their complaint to include several federal claims. Based on 
the additions, the City removed the action to federal court. The Clouds claim damages for breach 
of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(violation of due process and for taking property without just compensation) and for attorney fees 
under 42 U.S.C. §1988. 
In the pending motion, the City moves for summary judgement in accordance with Rule 
56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STANDARD OF RE VIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law."1 In applying this standard, the court must examine the evidence and reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.2 Because the City 
'Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
2
 See Gaylor v. Does, 105 F.3d 572, 574 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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moves for summary judgment on all claims asserted by the Clouds, all reasonable inferences will 
be made in the light most favorable to the Clouds. * 
FEDERAL CLAIMS 
Substantive Due Process Claim 
The Clouds' claim that the City violated their substantive due process rights under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. However, they have not based their claims on a violation of federally protected 
rights. 
Before reaching the merits of the Clouds' substantive due process claim, the court must 
determine whether the property rights that the Clouds assert are protected "property interests" 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In the context of a zoning dispute, to state a claim under the fourteenth 
amendment for deprivation of "property" without due process of law a person 
must establish that he had a valid "property interest" in some benefit that was 
protectable under the fourteenth amendment at the time he was deprived of the 
benefit3 
In determining whether a property interest in some benefit rises to the level of a right protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court requires that courts look to "existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings 
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits."4 
In their complaint, the Clouds claims that they had a protected property interest in a 
certificate of occupancy for their newly constructed building, as well as an interest in the general 
2Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211-12 (2nd Cir. 1988) (citing JM. of 
Regentsv. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972)). 
4itor/7,408U.S.at577. 
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commercial use of their property. Both claims arise under state law, municipal ordinances, and 
other non-federal laws and regulations. There is no evidence that the Clouds are challenging the 
constitutionality of the statutory scheme that led to Chief Isom's denial and the City's subsequent 
refusal to issue the certificate of occupancy. 
As the Seventh Circuit has explained, this court should "not adopt a characterization of 
substantive due process that could effectively undermine established Supreme Court precedent 
requiring plaintiffs complaining of arbitrary deprivations of their property to seek redress 
through state remedies."5 To hold otherwise would go against the Supreme Court's refusal to 
"'make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever 
systems may already be administered by the States.'"6 In the Seventh Circuit case, the context 
was different, but the analysis the same: plaintiffs, like the Clouds, did not claim that a state 
statute was unconstitutional, but argued that the sheriff arbitrarily ignored state law when he 
seized property that was worth far more than the alleged debt.7 In distinguishing the plaintiffs* 
claims from valid substantive due process claims, the court explained that "if substantive 
constitutional rights are violated, the constitutionally recognized deprivation is complete at the 
time of the action, irrespective of the procedures available before or after the deprivation."8 That 
conclusion led the court to hold that "in cases where the plaintiff complains that he has been 
5Kauth v. Harford Ins. Co, of 111.
 y 852 F.2d 951, 957 (7th Cir. 1988). 
6Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 
(1976)). 
7£awr/*,852F.2dat956. 
*Id. at 958 (emphasis added). 
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( 
unreasonably deprived of a state-created property interest, without alleging a violation of some 
other substantive constitutional right or that the available state remedies are inadequate, the j 
plaintiff has not stated a substantive due process claim."9 
The Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Boatman v. Town of Oakland Florida sheds further 
light on the issue before the court and does so with facts strikingly similar to those in this case.10 
In that case, plaintiffs asked the town's building inspector to perform a final inspection so that 
the town could issue plaintiffs a certificate of occupancy. *l The inspector refused to inspect the 
home based on his opinion that the structure was a mobile home; to construct a mobile home in 
that area was, as understood by the inspector, a violation of the town's zoning ordinance.12 
Consequently, the town refused to issue a certificate of occupancy.13 As in this case, plaintiffs in 
Boatman brought a § 1983 claim alleging that "the town's refusal to issue a certificate of 
occupancy was 'arbitrary and capricious' and thus deprived them of a Vested property right in 
their building permit' in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."14 After a jury returned a 
verdict for the town, the judge granted plaintiffs' motion for judgment, finding that the plaintiffs' 
manufactured home was not a mobile home within the meaning of the town's zoning ordinance.15 
9Id. 
1076F.3d 341(1 lth Cir. 1996). 
l l76F.3dat342. 
l2Id. 
"Id. 
lAJd. at 343 (internal citation omitted). 
xsId. 344. 
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The town appealed. 
The Eleventh Circuit overruled the trial court's decision. In dismissing the substantive 
due process claim because of its state-created property right origin, the court held that c'[t]he 
notion that the Constitution gives a property owner a substantive right to a correct decision from 
a government official, such as a building inspector in this case, is novel indeed."16 The court 
found unpersuasive plaintiffs' argument that a substantive due process right is "triggered 
whenever an administrative decision is clearly mandated but the government official fails to 
act/'17 The court further found unavailing plaintiffs' assertion that "in refusing to follow the 
clear mandate of the law and to perform what is essentially a ministerial act, [the official] would 
be deemed to have acted 'arbitrarily and capriciously.'"18 The court concluded by labeling 
plaintiffs' theories as "novel" and "frivolous, as well."19 
This court finds the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits' analyses persuasive. In this case, the 
Clouds have access to several state remedies, including the state district court where this case 
was originally filed. Because the Clouds have not alleged a violation of some other substantive 
constitutional right or that the available state remedies, i.e., appeal Chief Isom's decision to the 
Board of Adjustments or continue their already begun state action, are inadequate, this court 
holds that the Clouds have failed to state a cognizable federal claim that the City violated their 
right to substantive due process. Therefore, without such allegations, the court must leave the 
,67tf.at346. 
l9Id. 
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Clouds to their state remedies. 
Procedural Due Process Claim 
The Clouds3 Procedural Due Process claims are dismissed because procedural due 
process does not require the City to provide them notice of state-law remedies. A primary 
purpose of the notice required by the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the opportunity for a 
hearing is meaningful.20 In this case, when the City refused to issue the certificate of occupancy, 
due process required it to take reasonable steps to give notice that the certificate was not issued 
so the applicant can pursue available remedies for its return.21 There is no dispute that the City 
notified the Clouds of its refusal to issue the certificate of occupancy. Instead, the Clouds argues 
that their procedural due process rights were violated because the City failed to give them notice 
of any appellate procedures by which Chief Isom's decision could have been reviewed. 
The court finds, as a matter of law, that no "rationale justifies requiring individualized 
notice of state-law remedies which . . . are established by published, generally available state 
statutes and case law."22 Once a permit applicant is informed that the City refused to issue a 
certificate of occupancy, "he can turn to these public sources to learn about the remedial 
procedures available to him."23 These sources include city ordinances, the Uniform Fire Code, 
and other applicable Utah statutes and administrative rules, all of which are published and 
™See City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 681 (1999); see also Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
lxId. 
nId 
23Id. at 681-82. 
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available to the public. Considering the many resources available that explain possible remedies, 
the City is not required to take further steps to inform them of their options.24 As the Supreme 
Court has explained, "[t:]he entire structure of our democratic government rests on the premise 
that the individual citizen is capable of informing himself about the particular policies that affect 
his destiny/'25 
The Clouds insists that the City is precluded from arguing this issue in light of Judge 
Shumate's prior findings and conclusions. It is unclear from the state court's ruling whether 
federal constitutional law was applied. Even if the state court had looked to possible federal 
claims, this court's holding remains the same. The state court carefully addressed a motion for 
the preliminary injunction that was before it. That injunction is not binding on this court 
becauseccthe findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a court granting a preliminary 
injunction are not binding at trial on the merits."26 Moreover, 4<when a district court holds a 
hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction it is not conducting a trial on the merits."27 The 
case is now in a different posture — the court has before it a fully-developed summary judgment 
motion. In ruling on that motion, the court in no way questions the state court's decision, but 
simply recognizes that the matter before him was significantly different from one calling for a 
final decision on the merits. Therefore, to the limited extent that this court's analysis and 
conclusion is different from any prior state-court finding or conclusion it is because of the court's 
24id. 
25Atkins v. Parker, All U.S. 115, 131 (1985). 
26Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). 
21Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Or . 2003). 
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( 
sole focus on federal law and because of the different posture of the case at this time. 
Takings Claim { 
The court also grants the City's summary judgment motion regarding the regulatory 
takings claim for lack of ripeness because the Clouds failed to obtain a final decision under state 
law. A Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claim is not ripe for adjudication when plaintiffs fail 
to obtain either a final decision or just compensation from the state actor.28 Because neither party 
addresses the just compensation issue, the court decides this motion based on lack of finality 
alone. 
In resolving a claim that bears instructive resemblance to this case, the Tenth Circuit held 
in Bateman v. City of West Bountiful that "a regulatory takings claim is not ripe 'until the 
government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision 
regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue."*29 Bateman began building 
. on his property after receiving a conditional use zoning permit from the city.30 While city 
inspectors visited the construction site, no one told Bateman that his property failed to meet 
setback and side yard requirements under local law.31 A few years after completing the 
construction, Bateman was unpleasantly surprised to find that he could not sell part of his 
property because one of the city officers who visited the construction site had recorded a 
nSee Bateman v. City of West Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704 (10th Cir. 1996) 
29Bateman, 89 F.3d 704, 706 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Williamson Planning Comm'/? v. 
Hamilton Banky 413 U.S. 172, 186-87 (1985)). 
i0See id. at 705-06. 
nSeeid. 
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Certificate of Noncompliance with regards to the setback and side yard deficiencies.32 Instead of 
appealing the officer's certificate to the Board of Adjustment under Utah law, Bateman filed a § 
1983 claim in federal court, alleging a regulatory takings violation without just compensation.33 
The Tenth Circuit held that Bateman's claim was not ripe for lack of finality because he failed to 
appeal the officer's certificate to the Board of Adjustment, a body created under Utah law that 
has authority to hear appeals from decisions applying zoning ordinances, to grant exceptions to 
zoning ordinances, and to issue variances from the zoning ordinances.34 In the court's view, 
"under Utah law, the board of adjustment has the authority to make a final determination 
regarding Bateman's property."35 
Here, as in Bateman, Chief Isom's determinations were not final because they were 
subject to determinative review by three different boards. First, § 103.1.4 of the Uniform Fire 
Code establishes a board of appeals that could have interpreted the fire code and rendered a 
favorable decision to the Clouds in regards to Chief Isom's determinations.36 Nevertheless, the 
Clouds did not appeal to that body. Second, under Utah administrative law, "[i]f a city, county, 
or fire protecting district refuses to establish a method of appeals regarding a portion of the [fire 
code], the appealing party may petition the [Utah Fire Prevention Board] to act as the board of 
32See id. 
33See id. at 706. 
34See id. 706-08. 
35Id at 707. 
3SSee Uniform Fire Code § 103.1.4 (vol. 1 1997). 
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< 
appeals."37 Nevertheless, the Clouds did not appeal to that board. And last, in accordance with 
the Utah Municipal Land Use and Development Management Act,38 the Clouds could have 
appealed Chief Isom's decision to the Washington City Board of Adjustment, which has the 
authority to hear and decide appeals "where it is alleged that there is error in any order, 
requirement, decision or determination made by any administrative official in the enforcement 
of * the zoning ordinances.39 
The Clouds do not dispute that they did not appeal to any of the available boards. Rather, 
they argue that the state court found the takings claim ripe because the state court issued a 
preliminary injunction against the City. As a result, the argument goes, this court is precluded 
from dismissing the takings claim because, under Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,40 the only federal 
court that can reverse or modify the judgment of a state court is the Supreme Court since "[t]he 
jurisdiction possessed by [federal] District Courts is strictly original/'41 This claim fails, 
however, because under 28 U.S-C. § 1450, "[a]ll injunctions, orders, and other proceedings" that 
had transpired in a state court before a case was removed to a federal district court may be 
"dissolved or modified by the [federal] district court/* As the Supreme Court has noted, "[tjhere 
is, of course, no question of the power of the District Court to dissolve [an] injunction" issued by 
37Utah Admin. Code R710-9-16.2 (2005). 
3
*See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-701, 703, 704 (2004). 
39See Washington City, Utah, Zoning Ordinance Chapter 4. 
40263 U.S. 413(1923)/ 
47rf. at416. 
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a state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1450.42 In so far as the state court injunction was based on a 
federal takings claim, this court treats it as it would have treated Hi tfiw^and dissolves i t 
Consequently, the Clouds' Rooker defense is insufficient to bar dismissal based on lack of 
ripeness. 
Because the Clouds failed to appeal Chief Isom's conclusions to any of the three 
appropriate boards, the court dismisses their takings claim for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.43 The takings claim is not ripe and therefore is dismissed without prejudice. 
STATE LAW CLAIMS 
In light of the court's dismissal of all federal claims asserted by the Clouds, it must now 
decide whether to continue to claim jurisdiction over the remaining state claims. "The district 
courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . i f . . . the district court 
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction."44 The court has dismissed all of 
the Clouds' claims over which it has original jurisdiction by dismissing their § 1983 action. The 
only remaining claims are the Clouds* pendent state law contract, interference, conversion 
claims, and motion for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine. Since these 
remaining claims deal solely with state law, they are better left to the jurisdiction of the state 
courts. Therefore, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Clouds' state 
law claims.45 These claims are dismissed without prejudice. 
A2SeeAvco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 561 n.4 (1968). 
43See Bateman, 89 F.3d at 706. 
"28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). 
45SeeDoe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 577 (10th Cir. 1994); United Mine Workers of Am. v. 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 
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CONCLUSION 
The City's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED M 
PART. As to the Clouds' federal claims, summary judgment is granted against the due process 
claims. The regulatory takings claim is dismissed without prejudice. Regarding the Clouds' 
state claims, summary judgment is denied and those claims are dismissed without prejudice. The 
case, then, is remanded to the state court. The clerk of the court is directed to close the case. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED this I'M day of April, 2005. 
BYTHECOURT: 
PaufG. Cassell 
United States District Judge 
J hereby ceriify Inct the cnnsxed document b a true 
and correct copy of the original on file in ibis cf Scs. 
ATTEST: MARKU5 B. 2MMER 
Clerk, U.S. District Court 
DisSrictdtUlcqa 
By: 
Deputy Clerk 
Date: 1/WoS" 
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Tina Loui 
City Recorder 
Washington City Offices 
111 North 100 East 
Washington, Utah 84780 
Russell Shirts 
Washington County Recorder 
87 North 200 East, Suite 101 
St George, Utah 84770 
Barbara Hjelle 
Washington County Water Conseivancy District 
136 North 100 East 
St George, Utah 84770 
Jeffrey N. Starkey 
Bryan J. Pattison 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
192 East 200 North, Third Floor 
St George, Utah 84770 
RE: Notice of claim 
To Whom It May Concern: 
N O T I C E O F C L A I M 
You are hereby notified that the below named plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of the 
law firm ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C. of Provo, Utah, intend to file legal action 
against the City of Washington. This notice is provided pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1L 
PLAINTIFFS: 
» Philip Cloud, Debbie Cloud, Clouds Moving & Storage Co. 
s 
ajMM*JB*IWWUUIllLlMIMg 
EXHIBIT 
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• Fred Buksa, Mary jtfuksa, F&M Steel Services, Inc. ! 
• Jarl Klungervik 
• A. KentCottom 
• JKR Development, LC 
BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: Washington City hired Sunrise Engineering to 
engineer water lines to surrounding community and commercial developments. Business owners 
in the Rio Virgin industrial park area have discovered that their water PSI levels fluctuate 
dramatically at various times. This fluctuation has significantly interfered with the business 
owners* operations. Furthermore, the business owners fear that there is insufficient water 
pressure should a fire erupt Finally, it is believed that Washington City has the ability to control 
the pressure by use of valves or other means and that Washington City failed to install the correct 
size of pipe or valves in the system as designated in the original plans submitted by Sunrise 
Engineering. 
NATURE OF THE CLAIM ASSERTED BY PLAINTIFFS: 
* Breach of contract 
• § 1983 claims in tort against certain city officials, including but not limited to the 
following persons: Michael Shaw, City Manager; Terrill Clove, Mayor and some or 
all of the following Washington City Council members: M. Heaton, ML Bundy, M. 
White, M. Arbuckle. The exact identity of all the persons against whom a claim will 
be filed is not known at the current time but will be communicated to all interested 
parties as soon as it is discovered. 
» Other causes of action 
DAMAGES 
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs include: 
® Actual and consequential damages for Washington City's breach of contract 
® Specific performance of the terms of the contract 
• Actual, consequential and punitive damages for the §1983 tort claims against 
Washington City and its officials. 
If at any time prior to the expiration of the 90-day statutory notice period you would like to 
discuss the possibility of settling this matter, please contact my office. 
Sincerely, . 
Justin R. Elswick 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 1501439 (D.Utah) 
(Cite as: 2005 WL 1501439 (D.Utah)) 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
D. Utah, Central Division. 
Phillip CLOUD, et al., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
WASHINGTON CITY, INC., et al., Defendants. 
No. 2:04-CV-266 TS. 
June 23, 2005. 
Patrick J. Ascione, Justin R. Elswick, Justin 
Douglas Heideman, Ascione Heideman & McKay 
LLC, Provo, UT, for Plaintiffs. 
Peter Stirba, Gary R. Guelker, Stirba & Associates, 
Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER PAR-
TIALLY GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE, AND DIS-
MISSING STATE CLAIMS WITHOUT PREJU-
DICE 
STEWART, J. 
*1 This matter is before the court on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' 
Motion to Strike Portions of Daniel Thorpe's Affi-
davit. On November 29, 2004, the court entered an 
order treating Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as one 
for summary judgment. On December 29, 2004, 
Defendants submitted their Motion to Strike Por-
tions of Daniel Thorpe's Affidavit. The Affidavit 
was subsequently amended and re-submitted by 
Plaintiffs on February 14, 2005. Defendants failed 
to renew any objection to the amended Affidavit, 
but together with Plaintiffs, submitted to the court a 
Motion to Suspend the Scheduling Order until the 
Motion for Summary Judgment was decided. The 
court granted the joint Motion to Suspend on March 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No 
16, 2005, and now will proceed to determine the 
Motion for Summary Judgment followed by the 
Motion to Strike. 
1. BACKGROUND 
The dispute in this case primarily emanates from 
insufficient water pressure at the Rio Virgin Indus-
trial Park (RVIP), located in Washington City, Utah 
(the City). Each of the Plaintiffs, Phillip Cloud, 
Debbie Cloud, Cloud Family Properties, L.L.C., 
Fred Buksa, Mary Buksa, F & M Steel Services, 
Inc., Michael Turnbow, Linda Tunbow, Jarl Klun-
gervik, A. Kent Cottam, JKR Development, Kim-
ball Gardner, and Gene Davis purchased property 
within RVIP, from Plaintiffs A. Kent Cottam and 
Jarl Klungervik, the principals of JKR, Develop-
ment, LC, the company responsible for the develop-
ment of RVIP. Also, each of the Plaintiffs, with the 
exception of Gardner, constructed at least one 
building within the park. 
II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks damages based on De-
fendants alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 
42 U.S.C. § 1988, claiming their water pressure and 
flow problems are attributable to Defendants, and 
amount to a constitutional taking under the Fifth 
Amendment. Additionally, Plaintiffs claim that the 
City arbitrarily and incorrectly applied its 
"ordinances, policy, and fire code" in violation of 
Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment substantive and 
due process rights. Broadly interpreted, Plaintiffs' 
Complaint further asserts a total of nine state law 
claims for substantive and procedural due process, 
constitutional taking, defamation, interference with 
existing and prospective economic relations, fraud-
ulent and negligent misrepresentation, and public 
and private nuisance. 
Summary judgment is only appropriate if "there is 
laim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering whether 
genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court de-
termines whether a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party in the face of all 
the evidence presented. Clifton v. Craig, 924 F.2d 
182, 183 (10th Cir.I991). "When applying this 
standard, we view the evidence and draw reason-
able inferences therefrom in the light most favor-
able to the nonmoving party." English v. Colo. 
Dep't of Corn, 248 F.3d 1002, 1007 (10th 
Cir.2001) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, because 
Defendants seek summary judgment on each of 
Plaintiffs' claims, the court makes all reasonable in-
ferences in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, 
and will first address the federal claims. 
A. Fifth Amendment Takings Claim 
*2 Plaintiffs allege that the insufficiency of water 
pressure to their properties is attributable to the city 
and amounts to a taking of their property in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Defendants move for summary judgment on 
the grounds that this claim is not ripe, as Plaintiffs 
failed to avail themselves of a state inverse con-
demnation proceeding prior to their filing of the 
federal action. 
The U.S. Constitution clearly proscribes that 
"private property shall not be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." U.S. Const, amend. V. 
However, "[b]efore a federal court can properly de-
termine whether the state has violated the Fifth 
Amendment, the aggrieved property owner must 
show first that the state deprived him of his prop-
erty, and second, that the state refused to com-
pensate him for his loss." Miller v. Campbell 
County, 945 F.2d 348, 352 (10 t h Cir.1991). In 
Utah, the proper procedure to address allegations of 
property "takings" is an inverse condemnation ac-
tion under state law. Patterson v. American Fork 
City, 67 P.3d 466, 477 (Utah 2003). "In those states 
that allow aggrieved property owners to bring an 
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adverse condemnation action in order to recover 
compensation for property taken by the state, a 
Fifth Amendment takings claim is not ripe until the 
aggrieved property owner 'has used the procedure 
and been denied just compensation.' " Miller.. 945 
F.2d at 352 (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. 
at 195). 
Even accepting Plaintiffs' Affidavit's as true, the 
court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to show that 
they were denied compensation through a state in-
verse condemnation proceeding. Plaintiffs' simul-
taneous filing of the state inverse condemnation 
proceeding and federal takings claims does not con-
stitute an exhaustion of state remedies. The state 
procedures have not been "used," rather, they have 
merely been initiated, and denial of compensation 
has not conclusively been determined. Therefore, 
the court will dismiss Plaintiffs claim without pre-
judice. 
B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims 
Plaintiffs argue that the City's arbitrary and incor-
rect application of its "ordinances, policy, and fire 
code" deprived them of their property without due 
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Prior to reaching the merits of Plaintiffs' due pro-
cess claim, the court must be satisfied that the due 
process claim is not subsumed by the takings claim. 
A due process claim is subsumed by the takings 
claim when the loss of property interest which is 
the subject of the due process claim, is identical to 
the property interest asserted in the takings claim. 
When a plaintiff alleges that he was denied a prop-
erty interest without due process, and the loss of 
that property interest is the same loss upon which 
the plaintiffs takings claim is based, we have re-
quired the plaintiff to utilize the remedies applic-
able to the taking claim. 
Rocky Mountain Materials & Asphalt. Inc. v. Bd. of 
County Comm'rs. 972 F.2d 309, 311 (10 
Cir.1992). 
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*3 The court finds that most of Plaintiffs' due pro-
cess and takings claims are identically based upon 
the Plaintiffs loss of water pressure. In relying on 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, this loss of water 
pressure has resulted in devaluation of Plaintiffs 
properties and an inability to use their hoses and 
sinks on a regular basis. Consequently, the court 
finds that Plaintiffs' "more generalized due process 
claim[s][are] subsumed by the more particularized 
protections of the Just Compensation Clause." Id. 
Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiffs' asserted 
property interests in the due process claim are not 
identical to those in the takings claim, Plaintiffs 
must have exhausted their administrative remedies 
prior to bringing this action. Unless Plaintiffs can 
show they qualify under a recognized exception, 
"[t]his Circuit deems the exhaustion of administrat-
ive remedies to be a prerequisite to federal court 
jurisdiction." Hawkins v. Defense Logistics Agency 
of the Depi. Of Defense, 99 F.3d 1149 (10 t h 
Cir.1996). 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to utilize 
Washington City Ord. No. 4-7, Utah Code Ann. § 
10-9-1001, Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d>, and § 103.1.4 
of the Washington City's Fire Code, prior to bring-
ing this federal action. Plaintiffs do not disagree, 
rather, they argue that exhaustion in this case would 
have been futile. However, 
[t]he purpose of the exhaustion rule is to permit 
agencies to exercise discretion and apply their ex-
pertise, to allow the complete development of the 
record before judicial review, to prevent parties 
from circumventing the procedures established by 
Congress, and to avoid unnecessary judicial de-
cisions by giving the agency an opportunity to cor-
rect errors. 
Ass'nfor Community Living in Coloradon v. Rorner, 
992F.2d 1040. 1044 (10 t h Cir. 1993). 
In viewing the facts most favorable to the Plaintiffs, 
as summary judgment requires, the court finds 
Plaintiffs' contention concerning available relief by 
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the Board is speculative, and "[speculative futility 
is not enough to justify federal jurisdiction.'1 Ordin-
ance 59 Ass'n v. U.S. Dept. of Interior Secretary, 
163 F.3d 1150, 1158 (10th Cir.1998). Washington 
City Ordinance 4-7 provides that an aggrieved party 
may appeal an "order, requirement, decision, or de-
termination made by any administrative official in 
the enforcement of [Washington City, Utah Zoning 
Ordinances]." If given an unfavorable ruling, Utah 
Code Ann. § J 0-9-J 001(1) provided an opportunity 
for Plaintiffs to "challenge in district court 
[Washington City's] land use decisions." Id. 
Plaintiffs assert that at final inspection, RVIP was 
receiving an adequate water supply, and that ma-
nipulation of the water valve, an administrative de-
cision, is partly responsible for the decrease in wa-
ter pressure. Since Plaintiffs have shown no reason 
why the Board of Appeals established by Ordinance 
4-7 could not effectuate a reversal of the decision to 
manipulate the water valve, or install water pipe of 
sufficient diameter, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently 
alleged the futility of an appeal to that Board. Con-
sequently, the court finds that Plaintiffs do not 
qualify under a recognized exception and therefore 
finds that they are not excused from exhausting 
their administrative and state remedies, and will 
dismiss their due process claims without prejudice. 
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988 Claims 
*4 Plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fail as 
a matter of law because based on the foregoing, 
Plaintiffs are unable to present facts sufficient to 
show they have suffered a constitutional depriva-
tion. Likewise, because Plaintiffs have failed to al-
lege a viable § 1983 claim, and further failed to 
vindicate any important public policy, they are not 
entitled to recovery of attorney fees pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1988. Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1 126, 
1143 (10 t h Cir. 1999). Consequently, the court 
grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and will dismiss Plaintiffs' § 1983 and $ 1988 
claims without prejudice 
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D. State Law Claims 
Since the court finds that the federal claims in this 
case no longer are at issue, it must next determine 
whether to continue to exercise supplemental juris-
diction over the remaining state claims. Pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the court is authorized to 
decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law 
claims when "the district court has dismissed all 
claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 
Since the court has dismissed each of Plaintiffs 
claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the 
court therefore declines to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and 
dismisses them without prejudice. 
III. DEFENDANTS MOTION TO STRIKE 
Defendants moved to strike Mr. Thorpe's affidavit 
on the grounds that it lacked specific facts, was 
conclusory, and lacked foundation. However, this 
Motion is largely moot. Rule 56(e) of the 
Fed.R.Civ.P. provides that "affidavits shall be made 
on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show af-
firmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to 
the matters stated therein.1' Id. Defendants identify 
a number of paragraphs in Mr. Thorpe's original af-
fidavit wherein Mr. Thorpe's affidavit is compared 
to rule 56(e) and found wanting. However, 
Plaintiffs have provided an amended copy of Mr. 
Thorpe's affidavit which appears to correct the por-
tions of the original which Defendants initially 
identified as not qualifying under rule 56(e). Since 
the amendment of the Mr. Thorpe's affidavit, De-
fendants have not renewed their objection concern-
ing the amended affidavit. Regardless, the Court 
need not rely on any part of the Affidavit in determ-
ining the merits of the federal claims, and will deny 
Defendants' Motion to Strike. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it is therefore 
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is partially GRANTED. Plaintiffs due 
process, Fifth Amendment takings, 42 U.S.C. § 
.1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 claims are dismissed 
without prejudice. The remaining state law claims 
are also dismissed without prejudice. It is further 
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Strike is 
DENIED. 
The clerk of the court is hereby directed to close 
this case. 
D.Utah,2O05. 
Cloud v. Washington City, Inc. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 1501439 
(D.Utah) 
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